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In the past decade, cyber operations have been increasingly utilized to further 
policy goals of state-sponsored actors to shift the balance of politics and power on a 
global scale.  One of the ways this has been evidenced is through the exploitation of 
electric grids via cyber means.   A remote tripping command injection attack is one of 
the types of attacks that could have devastating effects on the North American power 
grid.  To better understand these attacks and create detection axioms to both quickly 
identify and mitigate the effects of a remote tripping command injection attack, a dataset 
comprised of 128 variables (primarily synchrophasor measurements) was analyzed via 
statistical methods and machine learning algorithms in RStudio and WEKA software 
respectively.  While statistical methods were not successful due to the non-linearity and 
complexity of the dataset, machine learning algorithms surpassed accuracy metrics 
established in previous research given a simplified dataset of the specified attack and 
normal operational data.  This research allows future cybersecurity researchers to better 
understand remote tripping command injection attacks in comparison to normal 
operational conditions.  Further, an incorporation of the analysis has the potential to 
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CHAPTER 1: PURPOSE/RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the concepts that will be discussed in the 
body of this research.  The major themes, techniques, and technologies will be 
presented in a macro sense to illustrate the motivation behind the research, as well as a 
synopsis and direction of the remaining sections.  The majority of this introductory 
section is devoted to providing the motivation and inspiration behind this work, which is 
best demonstrated through an overview of the current state of geopolitics and recent 
developments amongst the inextricably linked domains of the energy sector and cyber 
operations.  The ultimate objective of this chapter is to provide a base level of 
background information to facilitate understanding of the research questions and to 
demonstrate there is a credible threat looming with the potential to strike the North 
American electric grid.  The state of current affairs suggests this field of research is 
meaningful and necessary to bolster the security of critical infrastructure in the United 
States (US). 
 
1.1 Introduction – The State of Cyber Operations in Geopolitics and Relation To 
Industrial Control Systems/Cyber Physical Systems 
 
 In the past two years, the US government, military, and several private 
cybersecurity organizations have published documents detailing the rising risk of 
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malicious cyber operations.  In 2016, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT, an organization of the US government which falls under 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) responded to over 290 incidents, of which 
59 were in the energy sector, 62 were in the communications sector, and 63 in the 
critical manufacturing sector (ICS-CERT, 2016).   Of note, spear phishing was present 
in 26% of the incidents making it the leading access vector, and the first known 
cyberattack to result in a physical impact to a power grid was observed (ICS-CERT, 
2016).  2017 was by all accounts a record breaking year in that there were 159,700 
reported cyber incidents, an 18.2% increase in reported breach incidents, a $5 billion 
financial impact from ransomware, and a 90% rise in business targeted ransomware 
(Online Trust Alliance, 2018).   
With this notable increase of cyber-attacks in the civilian sector and the evolution 
of state actors weaponizing cyber operations to both disrupt adversaries on the 
battlefield and influence geopolitics, in 2017 the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
increased the capabilities of US Cyber Command to a unified combatant command 
under Title 10, which means the unit is legally capable of conducting offensive 
cyberspace combat operations (Department of Defense, 2017).  The need to develop 
cyber capabilities has resulted in significant increases in funding and directives aimed at 
growing and educating US military cyber operations personnel, or what is now referred 
to as the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The CMF’s three primary missions include 1) 
defending and securing DoD networks and data, 2) supporting joint military commander 
objectives, and 3) defending U.S. critical infrastructure (Pomerleau, 2016).  
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The total DoD CMF is comprised of 133 teams and 6200 personnel (task 
organization: 13 teams to defend the nation’s infrastructure, 68 to defend DoD 
networks, 27 to provide support to combatant commanders, and 25 to provide analytic 
and planning support to the teams) (Pomerleau, 2017). As indicated above, there are 
significant resources and dedicated cyber defense teams being allocated to critical 
infrastructure in the US.  This is mirrored in Strategic Goal II of the DoD Cyber Policy 
which states, “Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from 
disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence” (Department of 
Defense, 2015).  The thirteen teams tasked with defense of the nation’s infrastructure 
face a multitude of threats, of which many are focused on the denial of essential 
services to the populace.   
 In addition to cyber operations being a powerful overt and conventional weapon 
during open conflict between nation states, disruption of essential services such as 
water, electricity, and natural gas can be wielded by adversarial nations as a tool to 
erode trust in a government’s legitimacy and ability to provide for its citizens.  The cyber 
dimension adds layers of complexity due to difficulties in proving decisive attribution to a 
particular actor.  In a way that mirrors what many pundits feel was malicious intent 
exhibited through likely nation state interference in the 2016 US Presidential elections, a 
possible ultimate goal of a malicious actor is to decrease citizens’ faith in the system 
itself, rather than the immediate effect of denying services to the population.  However, 
the denial of essential services such as electricity would also likely have severe 
economic implications due to reliance on electrically powered devices that form the 
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foundation of local business, and undoubtedly greatly affect the lives of citizens reliant 
on personal devices. 
There is evidence to suggest that Russia has conducted a proof of concept of 
this type of attack by depriving essential services in the Ukraine via a cyber vector in 
2015 and 2016 that denied power to close to half a million Ukrainians (Greenberg, 
2017). These events could potentially be a proof of concept or test bed for future 
engagements with nations that have greater cybersecurity capabilities/risk mitigation 
(Greenberg, 2017).  Denial or disruption of electricity could be used in concert with 
combat operations against a conventional opponent but could potentially be more 
effective against the civilian population to sow seeds of distrust and doubt about the 
efficacy of the government in responsibility of the affected region.  This could be seen 
as a larger campaign to erode citizens faith in the targeted government.  In any case, 
there is an immense need to classify attacks against the power grid quickly and with a 
high degree of accuracy to identify malicious activity early and mitigate 
damage/disruption of critical infrastructure and essential services.   
 The delivery of these essential services is made possible by Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS), which is a general term applied to control systems found in industrial 
sectors/critical infrastructure (NIST, 2015). ICS are comprised of myriad interoperating 
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components that act 
together to achieve an industrial objective and facilitate distribution of services to the 
population (NIST, 2015; Murphy, 2017).  This interoperation has multiple potential 
issues; first, there are systems that are interacting that were not initially designed to do 
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so; second, many of these interactions with legacy systems have outdated or unpatched 
security protocols; and third, is that there are generally conflicting interests between IT 
and OT processes/personnel, in which the OT side (usually comprised of engineers and 
management) are concerned with delivering service to a customer and the IT side 
(primarily comprised of cybersecurity or IT personnel) being concerned with security 
(and keeping systems and software updated to facilitate that security) (Murphy, 2017).  
There is a natural divide as reliability and security can often collide and decisions must 
be made that could hinder either side.  There are of course ramifications if either is 
neglected indefinitely, or if management consistently prioritizes one over the other 
(Murphy, 2017).  This dichotomy of competing interests can lead to vulnerabilities in the 
system that can in turn be potentially exploited by sophisticated threat actors.  While 
these threats have been present for many years, recent events on the global stage 
suggest such as the Ukrainian energy sector attacks that “potential” ICS vulnerabilities 
have been exploited by state sponsored actors via cyber operations. 
 In the past three months, there has been increasing evidence to suggest 
that a nation state has infiltrated the North American power grid and has the potential to 
execute malicious follow on operations.  This was shown in recent testimony in which 
the Secretary of the Department of Energy Rick Perry testified at a congressional 
hearing that there has undoubtedly been Russian infiltration in the North American 
power grid (Grandoni, 2018).  The United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT) echoed this congressional testimony in a publicly acknowledged 
(which is a new precedent) joint technical alert spearheaded by the Department of 
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Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Alert TA18-07A  
(Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors).  The alert warned of an ongoing multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian 
Threat Actors (RTA) and that the group has moved laterally throughout peripheral and 
target networks and are actively conducting network reconnaissance and information 
regarding North American ICS infrastructure (US-CERT, 2018).  
 The US-CERT report detailed that this campaign had been active since at least 
March of 2016, and that in addition to the energy sector, targeting also occurred in the 
nuclear, water, aviation, and other critical manufacturing sectors (US-CERT, 2018). The 
campaign was executed via the use of common tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) such as spear-phishing, staging of malware, and credential gathering, and initial 
victims were peripheral organizations with less secure networks but with access to the 
intended targets networks, which were then subsequently targeted (US-CERT, 2018).  
Additionally, common ICS trade publication/informational websites were modified to 
include malicious content with the ultimate goal of gaining credentials by compromising 
the peripheral organizations and an end goal of compromising an ICS organizational 
network and thus ICS infrastructure (US-CERT, 2018).  Once the intended target 
network was infiltrated, there were multiple observations of workstations and servers 
being accessed that contained data output from control systems within ICS facilities 
(US-CERT, 2018).  Files including (but not limited to) the configuration of systems within 
a specific ICS environment and Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) were accessed by the 
threat actor, indicating a high level of sophistication and information gain from the 
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campaign including reconstructed screenshots of exploited HMI accessed by RTA (US-
CERT, 2018).  While obtaining these screen captures, in at least one instance RTA 
used a logical format and naming convention that indicated the machine description, 
machine location, and organization name (Symantec, 2017).  Additionally, a string of 
“cntrl” was noted in some machine descriptions, potentially marking the machine as 
those the RTA has gained access to (Symantec, 2017).    
Leadership from prominent cybersecurity research organizations in the private 
sector have concurred with these assessments by the US government, with Eric Chien, 
a security technology director at Symantec stating in reference to Russia, “We now 
have evidence they’re sitting on the machines, connected to industrial control 
infrastructure, that allow them to effectively turn the power off or effect sabotage,” 
(Perlroth and Sanger, 2018).  A report from Symantec named the group of attacks the 
Dragonfly and Dragonfly 2.0 campaigns and asserts that RTA have been in operation 
since at least 2011, with possible attributions/involvement in notable energy sector 
attacks such as the 2015 and 2016 Ukraine power grid attacks mentioned above 
(Symantec, 2017).  Although the extent and scope of the infiltration of the North 
American grid by RTA is unknown, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the 
group is focused on gaining access to operational systems within the energy sector 
which could in turn be used to disrupt essential services (Symantec, 2017). 
Therefore, both government and private sector entities concur, based off the 
most recent evidence, that there exists a high likelihood that the systems which regulate 
and provide electricity on the North American Electric Grid have been compromised by 
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RTA.  If ICS networks have already been compromised (which is assumed in the 
dataset utilized in this work), the US is already in a reactionary state.  However, there is 
still a need to understand when an attack is occurring as quickly as possible to 
decrease the severity and reduce impacts to the population.  The use of synchrophasor 
technology and measurements via sensors will be explored in later sections (as it 
comprises the majority of data in the dataset) and should be a key tenant in a hybrid 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) comprised of both physical processes within ICS and 
the network/cyber component to quickly discern between attacks and normal 
operational conditions and thus mitigate damage to the greatest extent possible.   
To aid in the classification of attacks against ICS, a specific type of attack that 
has the propensity to disrupt the power grid through the exploitation of components 
associated with a generator, referred to as a remote tripping command injection attack, 
will be analyzed and modeled in the remaining sections of this work. The purpose of this 
research is to utilize statistical and/or machine learning methods to develop detection 
axioms for this type of attack via the analysis of variables (and parameters of variable 
values) in an open source dataset, and ultimately contribute to the formulation of an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to thwart attacks employed against ICS.  After finding 
an appropriate open source dataset, email communication with one of the dataset 
authors (Dr. Tommy Morris), indicated there was a dearth of open source research 
focused purely on detection of remote tripping command injection attacks (to his 
knowledge and further confirmed via the search of numerous academic journal 
databases), and thus was identified as an area in which the author could contribute to 
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the existing body of knowledge (Morris, 2018).  The utilization of simple methods was 
identified as a logical starting point to achieve baseline results and were applied prior to 
application of more sophisticated machine learning (ML) methods.  This research is 
focused on identifying a specific type of attack against the power grid with the highest 
accuracy possible, which could then potentially be utilized in the construction of a hybrid 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) utilizing synchrophasor measurements in ICS. The 
following research questions were thus developed to focus this thesis and facilitate 
solution formation. 
 
1.2 Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
 
Can the simple statistical methods of Logistic Regression, Stepwise Logistic 
Regression, or Principal Component Analysis classify remote tripping command 
injection attacks on electrical grids at 95% or greater accuracy? 
 
1.3 Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
 
Can machine learning methods classify remote tripping command injection 




1.4 Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
 
If RQ1 or RQ2 is true, can detection axioms be derived from this data for 
implementation in an IDS in future work? 
 
1.5 Research Question 4 (RQ4) 
 
In future work can these axioms/results be implemented in a Global Information 
Network Architecture (GINA) based IDS? 
 
1.6 Solution Formation 
 
Through an analysis of the Aurora event to define and explain a remote tripping 
command injection attack and a synthesized dataset (created by Mississippi State 
University and Oak Ridge National Laboratory and modified by the author to incorporate 
only remote tripping command injection attacks and normal operational data points) to 
analyze remote tripping command injection attack and normal operational data, the 
author will develop detection axioms based off confirmed relationships in the data 
utilizing statistical/ML methods.  It should be noted, that the original direction/goal of this 
thesis was to utilize GINA, a vector relational data modeling (VRDM) approach to 
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classify the data via multi-attribute scripts within the system to further analyze/classify 
remote tripping command injection attacks (and possibly compare/contrast the metrics 
of statistical/ML methods to determine which method yields better results).  Key to this 
utilization of GINA was the development of detection axioms which could be described 
as algorithms/rules to determine whether a given instance in the dataset was an attack 
or normal operations.  These detection axioms/rules would form the basis of a 
conceptual model for integration into the GINA framework.  Although GINA 
implementation was not realized in the course of the research largely due to the 
complexity of the dataset and time taken to analyze it, there is evidence to suggest that 
GINA could be incorporated in future work.  The timeline/methodology below in Figure 1 
demonstrates the key task breakdown for the research and a general synopsis of each 





Figure 1 - Thesis Key Task Breakdown 
 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
 
The sections are organized as follows to facilitate understanding of this thesis: 
Section II consists of background information regarding ICS and Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPS), the Aurora Vulnerability and implications of remote tripping command 
injection attacks, and synchrophasor technology and its integration into IDS.  Section III 
focuses on the synthesis and modification of the dataset, previous work associated with 
the dataset, statistical methodology/approaches utilized with results, and the ML 
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methodology/approaches utilized with results.  Section IV summarizes the results and 
conclusions about utilization of more sophisticated methods to classify attacks given the 





CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
This section provides the reader with the basic concepts of electrical power 
generation and the various machinery/components that make it possible, the concept of 
Information Technology (IT) vs Operational Technology (OT) in an electrical grid 
context, synchrophasor technology, and a review the Aurora Event and remote tripping 
command injection attacks.  
 
2.1 Electrical Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Basics  
 
Alternating current electricity fed into the grid can generally be categorized into 
generation, transmission, and distribution (NERC, 2013).  Generation through some 
form of energy (coal, gas, nuclear, etc.) occurs, and electricity is then transported 
across a series of high-voltage transmission and lower-voltage distribution lines to reach 
approximately 334 million people in homes and businesses in North America (NERC, 
2013).  A key component of the grid are transformers that step up electric voltage at 
generating stations for efficient transport and then step down voltage at substations to 
safely deliver low voltage electricity to customers (NERC, 2013). 
 Electricity flows through substations via bus to a circuit breaker that connects 
transmissions lines to a transformer and/or a generator to facilitate electricity 
distribution.   Substations are connected via transmission lines, which as mentioned 
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above, contain the machinery and ability to step up and step down power to facilitate 
transmission and distribution (NERC, 2013).  Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, various components of substations have become networked to facilitate 
operations, and thus the grid can be thought of as containing both IT components that 
interact with OT components.   
 
2.2 Information Technology and Operational Technology in ICS 
 
Major issues between the IT and OT subsets of ICS involve a lack of common 
terms and understanding of components (and their associated personnel), and also the 
end goals of what each seeks to preserve.  These end goals could be simplified for the 
OT side as focused on reliability, and for the IT side as focused on security (Murphy, 
2017).  While these two sides are not diametrically opposed in most cases, something 
such as a patching of an operator interface during peak hours would potentially be 
considered unacceptable from the OT perspective, as it is inherent (at least in the 
norms regarding essential services in the US) that power must be constant and reliable.  
Given the great reliance on devices powered by traditional forms of power generation 
(i.e., the grid as opposed to solar), this could be catastrophic to businesses and local 
economics.   
This focus is best exemplified by the two Reliability Concepts put forth by the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).  The first is adequacy, which is 
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defined as “the ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electrical demand 
and energy requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account 
scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements” (NERC, 
2013).  The second is operating reliability, defined as “the ability of the bulk-power 
system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electricity short circuits or 
unanticipated loss of system elements from credible contingencies, while avoiding 
uncontrolled cascading blackouts or damage to equipment”, in which the bulk-power 
system refers to all electric generation and transmission components and their 
associated control systems (NERC, 2013).  Note, that the emphasis seems skewed to 
supply demand of electricity at all times, and that there is nothing regarding security of 
the system or any type of risk mitigation regarding shutdowns due to 
physical/cybersecurity concerns. 
The interaction between IT and OT components in modern ICS is ubiquitous and 
necessary to provide essential services to the population.  However, this 
interconnectivity produces vulnerabilities in ICS network architecture that can be 
exploited.  This will be further explored in Section 2.5 which describes the Aurora 
vulnerability and Section 3.1 which provides information on the testbed architecture 





2.3 Synchrophasors and ICS 
 
As the vast majority of features/attributes from the dataset are synchrophasor or 
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) measurements, the following section will provide 
more information about how the technology works, the case for utilizing synchrophasor 
technology, and what the measurements mean. 
Electrical transmission systems composed of lines, breakers, and transformers 
form the basis for transmitting electricity from generators across long distances to load 
centers (Pan, Morris, Adhikari, March 2015).  With the increasingly connected nature of 
IT and OT components within ICS infrastructure, synchrophasor technology such as 
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are being utilized to serve as sensors to various 
processes occurring during transmission (Pan et al., March 2015).  The sensors are 
capable of monitoring real-time magnitude and phase of voltage, magnitude and phase 
of currents, and frequency of the system in a synchronized manner (Crappe, 2008).  
This synchronization allows an evaluation of the stability of power system network, load 
distribution calculations, and fault detections/locations (Crappe, 2008).  The PMU data 
is time stamped with Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) via Global Positions Systems 
signals, and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) collect said data and transmit data to a 
control center via Wide Area Network (WAN) (Pan et al., March 2015).  The PMU 
measurements are aggregated through a device called a Phasor Data Concentrator 
(PDC), which then sends said data to OpenPDC software that sorts and processes the 
data for operator analysis (Morris, 2018).   The overall system is called a Wide Area 
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Monitoring System (WAMS), and through this synchrophasor technology it is possible to 
measure transmission rates (comprised of multiple measurements of multiple systems) 
at a much higher rate than traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems (30 to 120 samples per second for WAMS, as opposed to 1 sample 
every several seconds for SCADA) (Pan et al., March 2015).  In addition to the increase 
of sampling rate, this method of obtaining measurements is extremely precise and 
exhibits very low error rates (Crappe, 2008).  The dataset utilized in this research is a 
time series of synchrophasor measurements in which all changes/variations in a given 
scenario are reflected via PMU data and also reflects the IT domain via device logs in 
the testbed architecture (such as SNORT) (See section 3.1 for a detailed description of 
the dataset). 
 
2.4 Incorporating Synchrophasor Data in Signature Based IDS 
 
 Due to the complex interactions between multiple components on both the IT and 
OT side, ICS and CPS (computational systems that monitor and control physical 
systems including but not limited to control systems, sensor-based system, and 
autonomous systems in an ICS), security is a complicated and unique challenge that 
requires interdisciplinary expertise and teamwork to properly mitigate threats (Redwood, 
2016).  There is often a lack of communication between IT and OT components due to 
restricted access and security review protocols that decrease the IT side from 
understanding the full specifications and inherent risks of a given CPS (Murphy, 2017).  
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The most widely used IDS systems in CPS (and thus ICS) are Network Based IDS 
(NIDS), which primarily rely on signature based and anomaly based detection (Host 
Based IDS (HIDS) are used rarely in CPS due to resource limitations on individual ICS 
components and the overall complexity of CPS) (Redwood, 2016) 
 Signature based intrusion detection is not necessarily limited to IT components, 
as there are often physical indicators in OT components as to when an attack is 
occurring (Redwood, 2016).  The benefit of utilizing an approach that focuses on sensor 
readings and physical measurements is ultimately that attacks can be detected 
regardless of the properties, stage, or attack vector (Redwood, 2016).  Despite 
exploitation on the cyber level, many specific attacks leave indications of malicious 
intent in a synchrophasor through electric current events or significant changes in 
voltage.  This has been demonstrated through research analyzing a brief power quality 
event in April 2015 with significant voltage sag, which was assessed and a likely source 
identified via PMU readings that would have been impossible to detect with legacy 
SCADA systems due to sampling rates (Jamei, Stewart, Peisert, Scaglione, McParland, 
Roberts, and McEachern, 2016).   
Accurately defined signature based models formed on detection axioms/rules 
could be integrated into a hybrid IDS comprised of both IT and OT monitoring 
components and provide representations of acceptable system behavior and also detect 
anomalous or malicious activity.  Previous research in the domain suggests that 
signature based rules are an integral component of a more comprehensive hybrid 
Synchrophasor Specific IDS (SS-IDS) comprised of both IT and OT component 
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monitoring (based on recommendations from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (Khan, Albalushi, McLaughlin, Laverty, and Sezer, 2018; NIST, 
2010).  Of note, the research in this work is specifically focused on phasor 
measurement values as opposed to other features that could be measured in a SS-IDS 
(Khan, Albalushi, McLaughlin, Laverty, and Sezer, 2018; NIST, 2010).   
Jamei et al. also proposed a synchrophasor based hybrid IDS (PMU-IDS), of 
which rules based physical constraints are employed to draw conclusions about the 
state of security in various levels of the grid.   This is specifically referenced in what the 
authors refer to as Stage 1, in which signatures of anomalies are detected in via phasor 
measurement variables similar to those used in this work (Jamei et al., 2016).  It should 
be noted that because signature based rules are derived from known and analyzed 
instances in a dataset, that values which are attacks that are outside of the attack 
parameters determined by analysis will not be detected.  Despite the potential 
limitations of the signature based model approach for a hybrid IDS, the method can 
establish rules that can provide a baseline for this specific type of attack which can be 
verified with further testing.  This work provides signature based intrusion detection 
axioms/rules of remote tripping command injection attacks developed via statistical/ML 




2.5 Historical Case Study – The Aurora Vulnerability and Remote Tripping 
Command Injection Attacks 
 
 In 2007, the US Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory conducted an 
experiment known as the Aurora Event or Aurora Vulnerability that displayed the 
vulnerabilities of generators connected to the electric grid (Zeller, February 2011).  This 
experiment demonstrated that an attack consisting of falsified commands over 
compromised communication networks could have severe ramifications on the 
distribution of power through the exploitation of a generator (Srivastava, Ernster, Pan, 
2013).  By intentionally opening and closing a breaker out of synchronism, the resulting 
high electrical current and torque were translated to high stress on the mechanical shaft 
of a generator which ultimately led to its destruction (Zeller, February 2011).  The 
exploitation of this vulnerability is referred to as a remote tripping command injection 
attack and will be further analyzed in Section 3. 
 A basic understanding of generators is necessary to display the nuances of this 
attack.  Generators are comprised of a magnet spinning inside a tightly wound coil of 
wire (also referred to as a winding or turn) which produces an electrical charge and 
magnetic field (electromagnetism) (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 101).  If one of the wires (a 
conductor) moves through the magnetic field it produces electrical pressure in the wire, 
and the magnetic field acts a force resisting its movement (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 
101).  The energy required to push the wire through the magnetic field is equal to the 
electric energy generated in the wire minus the energy lost in the conversion, and thus 
22 
 
mechanical work is converted into electricity (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 102).   The 
major safety feature that prevents overstress of a generator is a circuit breaker (Barnett 
and Bjornsgaard, 107).  A circuit breaker de-energizes components in an attempt to 
mitigate damage should an overload, high temperature, or other faults occur (Barnett 
and Bjornsgaard, 107). This mechanical work and friction from rotating parts in 
generators is the basic principle, and the knowledge of circuit breakers relationship to 
this mechanical force was exploited to facilitate a successful attack.  
 Protective relays in a power system monitor both the generator and main network 
power systems and have an intentional delay which are designed to protect the system 
by isolating faulty parts and preventing unnecessary tripping of power components 
during short period transient time (Srivastava et al., 2013).  The delay results in a small 
window where no protection is available (Srivastava et al., 2013 and Zeller, February 
2011).  Aurora attacks are designed to open the circuit breaker, wait for the generator to 
be out of synchronism, and then reclose the circuit breaker before the relay protection 
system identifies the anomaly (Zeller, February 2011).  Through the research conducted 
by M. Zeller, it was determined that less than 15 of these cycles are required to launch 
an attack on traditional generator protection elements.  This attack can be executed 
either locally or remotely depending on the topology of the substation communication 
networks (Srivastava et al., 2013).  
 While this type of attack is possible of being executed by a threat actor that has 
significant resources and capabilities, it is unlikely that threat actors of lesser resources 
and/or skill would be able to successful implement this type of attack (Zeller, April 
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2011).  Also, there are varying degrees of generator (and ultimately ICS) vulnerability 
based on numerous risk factors (Zeller, April 2011).  For example, communications 
protocols between the breakers and relays and the PMU can be compromised, relay 
communications ports can be hacked (often utilizing default passwords/usernames), 
and malicious programs can be embedded into the relay which initiate at a set time or 
condition (Zeller, April 2011).  These possible vulnerabilities indicate that there are 
multiple attack surfaces in a given generator that could make it susceptible to this type 
of attack, and also demonstrate the immense complexity of safeguarding ICS 
architecture (Zeller, April 2011).  
 It should be noted that the Aurora Vulnerability can be mitigated through sound 
cybersecurity practices at the organizational level and proper configuration of equipment 
in an ICS environment (Salmon, Zeller, Guzman, Mynam, and Donolo, 2009).  Proper 
configuration in this context refers to setting and maintaining robust generator protection 
schemes during both normal and faulted conditions, which for this specific type of attack 
includes disabling logic/protective elements preventing fast open/close operations of a 
breaker/relay (Salmon, Zeller, Guzman, Mynam, and Donolo, 2009). Generator 
protection schemes are often not enough to thwart this attack alone due to the fact that 
the attack is not initiated at the generator itself and is aimed at the exploitation of a node 
connected to the generator but not under the purview of its protection scheme (Zeller, 
April 2011).  Additionally, possible lapses in signal processing speed or intentional 
design of the system by engineers to smooth the signal via filtering and keeping the 
system connected opens a window for attack by limiting the relay to recognize sudden 
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changes in the system that might indicate malicious activity (Zeller, April 2011).  
Although there are ways to mitigate this vulnerability, there appear to be a limited 
number of utility organizations that have employed updated security measures given the 
amount of time and effort required to update legacy systems and the focus on providing 
consistent services at the expense of security (Swearingen, Brunasso, Weiss, and 
Huber, 2013).  Given the lack of incorporating mitigation factors to lessen the risk, this 
type of attack is still a viable and credible vulnerability that could be exploited by a well-
funded/resourced threat actor.   
It is also interesting to note the disclosure timeline for the Aurora Vulnerability, in 
which initial disclosure began in 2008 to affected domains but that all associated 
documents were released by DHS accidentally after a Freedom of Information Request 
inquiring about a non-related malware campaign called Operation Aurora in 2014 
(Waltman, 2016; Murphy, 2017).  Based on this, there appears to be a lack of 
information sharing at least to the public if not to the broader energy sector.  While there 
are certainly security implications of sharing this type of attack with the public, there are 
many potentially harmful repercussions given the prevalence of generators across 
multiple domains/industries.  Although not directly related, information sharing regarding 
attacks could also be discouraged by the shift of the electric power industry from 
regulated utilities to a more open marketplace to foster competition amongst utility 
companies via deregulation through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Barnett and 
Bjornsgaard, 51 and 226).  There are numerous requirements of energy companies 
including designing facilities, attaining all permits, adhering to maintenance/operational 
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and repair procedures, all of which are significant endeavors (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 
226).  Information sharing is likely not high on the priority list, and actually might allow 
for a rival company to have a competitive advantage (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 226).   
While the need for information sharing for the collective security of critical infrastructure 
is undoubtedly required, the conditions do not make it likely.   Therefore, there is a need 
for independent research be conducted on open source datasets to better understand 
and analyze existing attack data.  These findings could then be published and have the 
potential to help multiple affected parties without removing the financial incentives or 
competitive advantages of said organizations.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PREVIOUS WORK ASSOCIATED WITH 
DATASET, AND RESULTS 
 
This section describes the dataset and methodology utilized to analyze and 
classify remote tripping command injection attacks on the electrical grid given both 
physical measurements and traditional cyber logs.  The approach below began with the 
utilization of statistical methods to better understand the dataset and determine if 
simple/straight forward statistical methods could be applied with a high degree of 
accuracy and facilitate the construction of detection axioms.  After this statistical 
approach was applied without yielding successful results, a ML approach aligned with 
previous work associated with the original dataset was applied with success in 
classification of remote tripping command injection attacks.   
 
3.1 Dataset Description 
 
 After an exhaustive search and consultation with SMEs in the domain, the author 
found an open source ICS attack dataset that incorporated both IT and OT attributes.  
This dataset was created in a joint collaboration between researchers at Mississippi 
State University and Oak Ridge National Laboratories and is the only dataset that could 
be identified that represented OT in the form of synchrophasor data, and also common 
IT data such as SNORT logs (Adhikari, Pan, Morris, Borges-Hink, and Beaver, 2014).  
Having both IT and OT components in the dataset was important as GINA excels at 
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analysis of data from multiple domains and is also more indicative of hybrid IDS in ICS 
environments which take into consideration multiple streams of data to analyze the 
system state (Anderson, 2018 and Redwood, 2018).  The initial dataset contained 
fifteen sets of data in the CSV/ARFF format comprised of six groups of power system 
event scenarios representing natural events, no events (or normal operational 
conditions), and attack events (see table below; Adhikari et al., 2014).   
 
Table 1 - Original Dataset Scenario Types (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) 
Type of Scenario Description 
Short Circuit Fault A short at a various location in a 
power line; location indicated by 
percentage range (see table below 
for further clarification) 
Line Maintenance Normal maintenance (not attack 
behavior) disables one or more 
relays on a specific line 
Attack – Remote Tripping Command 
Injection 
Attacker sends command to relay 
which causes breakers to open; 
Aurora Vulnerability 
Attack – Relay Setting Change Attacker changes setting of distance 
protection scheme on relay so that 
said relay will not trip for a valid 
fault/command 
Attack – Data Injection Attacker changes values such as 
current, or voltage to imitate valid 
faults (goal is to blind operator and 
cause black out) 
Normal Operations Self-explanatory  
 
From these major groups there is a total of thirty-seven scenarios, further 
explained by the table below (scenario numbers 31-34 were not used in the numbering 
convention).  Scenarios 15-20 (Remote Tripping Command Injection Attacks) and 41 
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(Normal Operational Conditions) were isolated from the original dataset and used for 
the analysis in this section and future sections of this research. 
Table 2 - Expanded Table of Dataset Scenarios (modified form Adhikari et al., 2013) 
Scenario Number Description Type 
1 Fault from 10-19% on Line 1 Natural 
2 Fault from 20-79% on Line 1 Natural 
3 Fault from 80-90% on Line 1 Natural 
4 Fault from 10-19% on Line 2 Natural 
5 Fault from 20-79% on Line 2 Natural 
6 Fault from 80-90% on Line 2 Natural 
7 Fault from 10-19% on Line 1 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
8 Fault from 20-79% on Line 1 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
9 Fault from 80-90% on Line 1 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
10 Fault from 10-19% on Line 2 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
11 Fault from 20-79% on Line 2 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
12 Fault from 80-90% on Line 2 w/ tripping 
command – data injection 
Attack 
13 Line 1 maintenance Natural 
14 Line 2 maintenance Natural 
15 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R1 
Attack 
16 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R2 
Attack 
17 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R3 
Attack 
18 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R4 
Attack 
19 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R1 and R2 
Attack 
20 Remote Tripping Command Injection to 
R3 and R4 
Attack 
21 Fault from 10-19% on Line 1 with R1 
disabled and fault – relay setting change  
Attack 
22 Fault from 20-90% on Line 1 with R1 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
23 Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R2 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
24 Fault from 50-79% on Line 1 with R2 




Scenario Number Description Type 
25 Fault from 80-90% on Line 1 with R2 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
26 Fault from 10-19% on Line 2 with R3 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
27 Fault from 20-49% on Line 2 with R3 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
28 Fault from 50-90% on Line 2 with R3 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
29 Fault from 10-79% on Line 2 with R4 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
30 Fault from 80-90% on Line 2 with R4 
disabled and fault – relay setting change 
Attack 
31 Scenario Number Not Used N/A 
32 Scenario Number Not Used N/A 
33 Scenario Number Not Used N/A 
34 Scenario Number Not Used N/A 
35 Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R1 and 
R2 disabled and fault – relay setting 
change 
Attack 
36 Fault from 50-90% on Line 1 with R1 and 
R2 disabled and fault – relay setting 
change 
Attack 
37 Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R3 and 
R4 disabled and fault – relay setting 
change 
Attack 
38 Fault from 50-90% on Line 1 with R3 and 
R4 disabled and fault – relay setting 
change 
Attack 
39 L1 maintenance with R1 and R2 disabled 
– relay setting change 
Attack 
40 L1 maintenance with R1 and R2 disabled 
– relay setting change 
Attack 
41 Normal operational load changes Natural 
 
The power system configuration utilized to generate the data is represented 
below and is referred to as a 3 bus 2 generator system. As indicated in the graphic 
below, the primary components consist of generators (represented by G), breakers 
(represented by BR), and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) (utilized to switch 
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breakers on/off, represented by R, controls like numbered breaker (i.e., R1 controls 
BR1)).   
 
 
Figure 2 - Dataset Testbed Architecture (modified from Adhikarai et a., 2013) 
 
For the original multiclass dataset, data was populated into the ARFF format, 
which encompassed fifteen datasets comprised of approximately 5,000 data entries 
each.  These data are composed of 128 features or variables that are primarily sourced 
from phasor measurement units (PMUs) or synchrophasors.  The data was measured at 
120 samples per second, and each scenario was simulated for 17 seconds, which 
equates to each row representing 8.3 milliseconds in a CSV file (Morris, 2018).   
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The tables below explain the 128 measurements that comprise the dataset.  In 
accordance with the power system configuration diagram, there are 4 PMUs, each 
associated with one relay which produce 29 measurements (4PMUs x 29Measurements 
= 116 Measurements).  The remaining twelve variables are binary data associated with 
control panel, relay, and SNORT logs.  The final column is the marker/class (see tables 
below): the first table shows the naming convention for all features, and the second 
table is a detailed naming convention for R1 features (R1 is the only relay represented 
for simplicity below; the same convention is used for R2-R4)).   
 
Table 3 - Attributes/Features of Dataset (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) 
Feature (note, R1-4 will precede in raw 
dataset) 
Description 
PA1:VH-PA3:VH Phase A-C Voltage Phase Angle 
PM1:V-PM3:V Phase A-C Voltage Phase 
Magnitude 
PA4:IH-PA6IH Phase A-C Current Phase Angle 
PM4:I-PM6:I Phase A-C Current Phase 
Magnitude 
PA7:VH-PA9:VH Pos.-Neg.-Zero Voltage Phase 
Angle 




Feature (note, R1-4 will precede in raw 
dataset) 
Description 
PA10:VH-PA12:VH Pos.-Neg.-Zero Current Phase 
Angle 
PM10:V-PM12:V Pos.-Neg.-Zero Current Phase 
Magnitude 
F Frequency for relays 
DF Frequency Delta (df/dt) for relays 
PA:Z Appearance Impedance for relays 
PA:ZH  Appearance Impedance Angle for 
relays 
S Status Flag for relays 
control_panel_log1 Self-explanatory; binary data 
relay1_log Self-explanatory; binary data 
snort_log1 Self-explanatory; binary data 
 
 
Table 4 - R1 Features Breakdown (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) 
Feature Description 
R1-PA1:VH R1 Phase A Voltage Phase Angle 
R1-PM1:V R1 Phase A Voltage Phase 
Magnitude 




R1-PM2:V R1 Phase B Voltage Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA3:VH R1 Phase C Voltage Phase Angle 
R1-PM3:V R1 Phase C Voltage Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA4:IH R1 Phase A Current Phase Angle 
R1-PM4:I R1 Phase A Current Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA5:IH R1 Phase B Current Phase Angle 
R1-PM5:I R1 Phase B Current Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA6:IH R1 Phase C Current Phase Angle 
R1-PM6:I R1 Phase C Current Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA7:VH R1 Pos. Voltage Phase Angle 
R1-PM7:V R1 Pos. Voltage Phase Magnitude 
R1-PA8:VH R1 Neg. Voltage Phase Angle 
R1-PM8:V R1 Neg. Voltage Phase Magnitude 
R1-PA9:VH R1 Zero Voltage Phase Angle 
R1-PM9:V R1 Zero Voltage Phase Magnitude 
R1-PA10:VH R1 Pos. Voltage Current Phase 
Angle 
R1-PM10:V R1 Pos. Voltage Current Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA11:VH R1 Neg. Voltage Current Phase 
Angle 
R1-PM11:V R1 Neg. Voltage Current Phase 
Magnitude 
R1-PA12:VH R1 Zero Voltage Current Phase 
Angle 





R1-F R1 frequency for relay 
R1-DF R1 frequency delta (df/dt) for relay 
R1-PA:Z R1 appearance impedance for relay 
R1-PA:ZH R1 appearance impedance angle 
for relay 
R1:S R1 status flag for relay 
 
 
3.2 Dataset Assumptions and Additional Information 
 
The first major assumption of the dataset is that the IT network has been 
breached by an adversary (as indicated by Figure 2 above). Also of note, IEDs cannot 
determine if a command to open/close breakers has been issued from an adversary due 
to a lack of internal validation (Adhikari et al., 2014). Therefore, opening/closing 
breakers will not be detected as malicious as there is not a mechanism to determine 
where the command is coming from (i.e., from an operator or from an adversary) 
(Adhikari et al., 2014).  In the testbed architecture, SNORT was monitoring only whether 
a packet had been sent to trip, and a single packet could be a legitimate command if 
observed by both SNORT and the overall Energy Management System from an 
operator (Morris, 2018).  If only SNORT observed the packet however, this would 
indicate an attack had been initiated by an adversary (Morris, 2018).  Additionally, to 
provide detailed and specific analysis of remote tripping command injection attacks, 
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only remote tripping command injection attack data and normal operational data was 
considered during analysis (see Section 3.4 for modification details).   
 
3.3 Previous Work Associated with Dataset 
 
In the next section regarding work associated with this dataset, the article that is 
most directly related to this work is entitled Machine Learning Power System and Cyber 
Attack Discrimination and Classification of Disturbances (Borges-Hink, Beaver, 
Buckner, Morris, Adhikari, and Pan, 2014).  In this article, the original dataset was 
utilized in its original form with all scenarios.  The research methodology and results 
from Borges-Hink et al. most directly impacted the ML methodology outlined in Section 
3.6.   
The authors theorized in this work that ML algorithms in the open source 
software Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) could “leverage non-
linear complex relationships between power system measurements and be able to 
discriminate between malicious, non-malicious, and normal disturbances” (Borges-Hink 
et al., 2014).  Utilizing 10-fold cross validation and 90/10 train/test split, a series of ML 
classification algorithms were applied to the dataset including OneR, NNGe , Random 
Forests, Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines (SVM), JRipper, and 




Table 5 - ML Algorithm Descriptions (modified from Borges-Hink et al., 2014) 
ML Algorithm Name Description 
OneR A simple learner that evaluates each 
features’ optimum rule and chooses 
best from all feature sets 
NNGe Nearest neighbor like algorithm that 
compares new examples to 
surrounding datapoints 
Random Forests Tree predictors cast a vote for most 
popular class/input of new instance 
Naïve-Bayes Probabilistic classifier based on 
Bayes theorem 
Support Vector Machines Algorithm that classifies classes 
based on hyper planes that 
maximize margin between classes 
JRipper Incremental reduced error pruning 
algorithm that uses a separate and 
conquer methodology 
Adaboost Adaptive boosting; improves 
performance of a base algorithm 
based on misclassification of 




  A comparison of these learners across the dataset was illustrated via the 
plotting of metrics including accuracy, recall, precision, and F-Measure, and results 
indicated that JRipper+Adaboost had the highest accuracy across all metrics 
(approximately 95%) (Borges-Hink et al., 2014).  The authors state the high 
performance of JRipper+Adaboost was likely due to its tree-based approach to rule 
generation and the addition of a mechanism to focus on misclassification of previous 
data (Borges-Hink et al., 2014).  It should be noted that while classification was 
successful regarding differentiation between disturbances and attacks, the ML 
algorithms were not able to classify specific fault and attack types within each larger 
scenario category (Pan, Morris, and Adhikari, 2015).  Also, while the research 
conducted by Borges-Hink et al. explores classification of the entire dataset and 
associated scenarios, it does not specifically address classification of individual 
scenarios such as specific types of attacks.   
Although not directly utilizing the dataset in this work, a related article entitled An 
Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious SCADA Communications 
details a similar application of the same ML algorithms (with the addition of J48, a 
decision tree algorithm) to readings from remote terminal units (RTU) in another ICS 
environment, a gas pipeline system (Borges-Hink, Beaver, Buckner, Morris, Adhikari, 
and Pan, 2013).  This work included normal operational observations and also 
observations of similar attacks to the remote tripping command injection attack including 
an Illegal Process ID Attack, in which a malicious command is sent to a Programmable 
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Logic Controller (PLC) to modify performance, but also included other types of 
command injection attacks such as manipulation of the setpoint of the pipeline pressure 
valve, and also command injection attacks that dealt primarily with manipulating 
outgoing commands in the system to acquire information (address and function scans) 
(Borges-Hink et al., 2013).  However, it must be mentioned that the dataset structures 
are not similar, with instances of normal operations (28,086) and command injection 
attacks (257, of which only 49 are similar to a remote tripping command injection) 
utilized in Borges-Hink et al. being very different than the dataset utilized in this work 
(8,737 instances of remote tripping command injection attacks, 4,405 instances of 
normal operations) (Borges-Hink et al., 2013).   
While this difference could have an impact on the comparative findings, the major 
takeaways from this work are still interesting to note.  The article echoes previous 
findings that attacks and normal operations have higher classification rates in binary 
datasets than multiclass datasets (Borges-Hink et al., 2013).  The work also identified 
the highest accuracy classifiers as nearest neighbor algorithms (NNGe) and decision 
tree algorithms (Random Forests) (Borges-Hink et al., 2013).  The NNGe ML algorithm 
utilizes non-nested generalized exemplars, which are defined as examples of a dataset 
stored in memory that instead of being stored verbatim are merged with like examples 
which reduces storage in memory and thus reduces classification time, a common issue 
that compounds with a growing dataset and ultimately can render the exemplar 
database useless due to lack of memory capacity or untenable times for classification 
(Martin, 1995).  This improvement to the nearest neighbor algorithm was proven to 
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increase classification performance by an average of 2.6% over standard nearest 
neighbor algorithms and also reduces classification time by 62% due to the reduction in 
exemplars (Martin, 1995).  The Random Forests algorithm combines tree predictors 
where values depend on values of a randomly sampled vector (Breiman, 2001). This 
randomly sampled vector is part of a greater “forest” of trees and has the same 
distribution of all the trees (Breiman, 2001).  The trees then “vote” for the most popular 
class, and the method has been shown to have lower generalization errors than other 
classifiers (Breiman, 2001). 
As demonstrated by the differing results in the two articles above, it is likely that 
the specific ICS environment and type of attack highly influence the classification rates 
and accuracy metrics of a given ML algorithm.  This could indicate that an application of 
differing ML approaches would yield different results based on the type of specific attack 
being analyzed.   Therefore, subsetting existing datasets could potentially provide 
beneficial analysis for specific attacks that would be useful in early detection and 
mitigation.   
 
 
3.4 Data Cleaning and Initial Analysis 
 
Due to the large number of variables (128) and samples (13,142) in the modified 
dataset, the first step taken during analysis was an initial observation and subsequent 
40 
 
cleaning of the data, in which data cleaning can be defined as the process of 
transforming raw data to consistent data to facilitate analysis (De Jonge and Van Der 
Loo, 2013).  It should be noted, prior to this step, while R is capable of reading multiple 
file formats including both ARFF and CSV, the author converted the original multiclass 
ARFF files to CSV files to facilitate modification of the dataset, and also to convert the 
file to a format that was easily readable for initial analysis in a program that the author 
had experience with (Excel (Microsoft, 1987) (for R scripts detailing the conversion 
process, see Appendix C).  The dataset was modified to include only two scenarios 
listed above in Section 2 of this work (scenario 41-normal operations, and scenarios 15-
20-remote tripping command injection attacks).  This modification was executed to 
simplify the dataset and facilitate remote tripping command injection attack analysis 
regardless of exploitation of a single relay or multiple relays.  The resulting modified 
dataset utilized for further analysis of remote tripping command injection attacks was 
comprised of 13,142 instances of which 8,737 instances were attacks, and 4,405 
instances were normal operations. 
After initial modification of the dataset, the next step in data cleaning was to 
analyze the variables in the CSV file.  This was executed through both manual analysis 
utilizing filters in Excel, and from utilizing scripts in R.  From this initial analysis, the 
author determined that control panel logs from R1-R4 exhibited no presence of tripping 
throughout the entire dataset.  Additionally, the author identified that SNORT Logs for 
Relays 1-4 had a sum total of 8 instances in which a packet was identified as sending a 
trip command to a relay (twice for SNORT Log 1 identifying trip commands to R1 as 
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indicated by Relay Log 1, once for SNORT Log 2 to identify trip commands to R2, three 
times for SNORT Log 3 to identify trip commands to R3, and twice for SNORT Log 4 to 
identify trip commands to R4).  With only 8 instances of 8737 attacks (.091%), 
representing 8 individual scenarios out of 105 total (7.61%), this likely indicates that 
SNORT (and by extension other packet sniffing intrusion detection systems) is not an 
integral component for identifying a remote tripping command injection attack for this 
dataset and that synchrophasor measurements will largely be the basis for 
detection/classification.  SNORT and other log variables were not omitted from the 
dataset however, as these variables are the only variables that represent IT 
components, one of the unique characteristics that led to selection of this open source 
dataset. 
Also, during initial dataset analysis 1,379 instances of data were identified that 
exhibited infinite values in the relay appearance impedance variables (R1.PA.Z – 399 
values, R2.PA.Z – 377 values, R3.PA.Z – 315 values, and R4.PA.Z – 288 values).  
Numerous errors occurred in processing the data in R due to these infinite values, but 
due to the fact that all values corresponded to attacks (that in turn corresponded to 
which relay was being attacked via remote tripping command injection (i.e., scenarios 
15 and 19 for R1.PA.Z, scenarios 19 and 16 for R2.PA.Z, scenarios 17 and 20 for 
R3.PA.Z, and scenarios 18 and 20 for R4.PA.Z), it was necessary to replace the infinite 
values with a constant to facilitate further analysis in R.   
As previous research has suggested that in both symmetric and asymmetric 
distributions a linear interpolation for missing data values yields high degrees of 
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accuracy in time series data with large sample sizes (where accuracy is measured in 
mean absolute percentage error, mean absolute deviation, and mean squared 
deviation), a modified method for imputation was utilized by taking the largest relay 
appearance impedance values in each original scenario and applying a multiplier of 2 to 
replace the infinite values in the dataset (Mahmoud, Date Unknown).1  By doubling the 
largest values, a spike in the data relative to each specific scenario can be easily 
observed.  Analysis of all scenarios in the dataset which exhibited infinite values was 
executed via Excel sorting filters to identify the largest values.  This imputation 
technique could be categorized as blending a single value approach as a constant was 
used, and a local similarity approach as a series of values within each individual 
scenario was utilized (Webb-Robertson, Wilberg, Matzke, Brown, Wang, McDermott, 
Smith, Rodland, Metz, Pounds, and Waters, 2015).  Imputation was necessary to avoid 
eliminating over a thousand remote tripping command injection attack instances and to 
retain as much data as possible in the dataset for analysis and model formation.   
Upon completion of this data cleaning/transformation, the CSV file was read into 
R for analysis of the variables (see Appendix B).  Initial plots of all variables with respect 
to the marker variable (whether the instance was an attack or not) were created after 
the loading of the data (see Appendix D).  While there were ranges of specific variables 
that indicated an attack or normal operations, initial observation of these plots did not 
                                            
1 Note, the first iteration of this data cleaning step utilized the arithmetic mean of the five greatest values 
in a given scenario; this however yielded the majority of values being lower than the greatest value in a 
cohort.  Thus, to show the spike in activity, doubling the greatest value in a scenario (regardless if this 
value was an outlier) was utilized  
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yield significant results as the majority of the instances demonstrated a wide range of 
values regardless if the instance was an attack or normal operations.   
 
3.5 Statistical Methods Approach 
 
A statistical methods approach was first employed to identify if simple and easily 
employable methods could provide analysis and accurate classification of the dataset.  
The overarching goal was to simplify and reduce the trivial elements of the dataset to 
facilitate axiom development.  The development of a small number of detection axioms 
or rules was integral for implementation of a conceptual model in GINA, the original 
direction of this work.  To begin development of these rules and further analyze the 
dataset given the initial observations from Section 3.4, two statistical methods were 
utilized.   
Logistic regression and by extension Stepwise Logistic Regression (SLR) was 
the first statistical method employed.  Logistic regression is considered a part of the 
generalized linear model family, in which a response variable is discrete and errors do 
not follow normal distributions (Lindquist, Date Unknown).  This method is considered 
appropriate in datasets such as the one used in this work where the data is binary and 
categorical (Lindquist, Date Unknown).  SLR refers to utilizing multiple logistic 
regression equations to fit the data and remove variables, and RStudio incorporates 
both forward and backward methods (i.e., starting the model with no variables and 
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testing improvement in the model by adding explanatory variables, or starting with all 
explanatory variables and removing them sequentially until no further improvement is 
possible).   Hybrid techniques integrating SLR have been utilized in the cybersecurity 
domain to improve classification in large time series malware datasets (Huda, Bawajy, 
Abdollahian, Islam, and Yearwood, 2016).  
 SLR was utilized in this work to remove variables in the dataset that had little 
impact on instance classification.  The ultimate goal was to reduce the complexity of the 
dataset and thus facilitate the development of detection axioms.  After fitting a logistic 
model to the data (with the exception of SNORT, Relays, and Control Panel logs, as 
SLR cannot be applied to the factor data type for explanatory variables), the stepwise 
function was executed in R.  Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a widely utilized 
model selection criterion based off likelihood and asymptotic properties of the maximum 
likelihood estimator popularized by Hirotogu Akaike in his 1973 work, Information 
Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle) and is used as the 
primary component for goodness of fit in R during SLR (Pan, 2001).  AIC is defined as 
AIC = - 2logL(M) + 2*K, and the removal of explanatory variables that do not affect the 
response variable will cause decreasing AIC values and thus indicate a model is 
becoming more accurate.  Once these variables are identified and removed, complexity 
of the model is also decreased, which will help facilitate the construction of detection 
axioms for remote tripping command injection attacks (Shtatland, Cain, and Barton, 
2001; Akaike, 1973).   
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After standardizing the data, logistic regression and SLR models were created in 
RStudio, a data analysis software environment for the R programming language 
(RStudio Inc., 2011) (see Appendix E for R Scripts).  The AIC of the initial SLR model 
based on the standardized dataset was 254,339.8.4 and was reduced to 151,248.9 by 
the elimination of R4.PMI2.I (IED 4 Zero Current Phase Magnitude), R1. PM11.I (IED 1 
Negative Current Phase Magnitude), and R3.PM7.V (IED 3 Positive Voltage Phase 
Magnitude).  This indicates that these variables should be removed from the model to 
facilitate further analysis and axiom development, as they are not explanatory values 
which affect the outcome as to whether an instance is an attack or normal operations.  
By removing these variables bias and model inaccuracy will be decreased (Bozdogan, 
1987).   
However, utilizing the plot function in R to obtain the Residuals Scale-Location 
indicated that there were 3,469 instances that did not conform to the initial logistic 
regression model (see plot below; 9,673 instances did conform to the model as 
indicated by the thick line running parallel to the X axis) (Wiegand, 2018).  Residuals 
can be thought of as False Negatives (FN), and that the models below would 
misclassify these instances as normal operations (Wiegand, 2018).  Due to the severity 
of electrical outages and potential ramifications, it is necessary to catch all instances of 





Figure 3 - Residual Plot of Initial Logistic Regression Model 
 
Through the use of filter commands in R the class of the high residuals were identified, 
in which high residuals have over a value of 2.0 for the square root of the standard 
deviance of residual value in the plot above. There were 3,469 high residuals identified, 
and through the use of R Scripts all 3,469 instances were identified as of the attack 
class (see Appendix E for R scripts/outputs) (Wiegand, 2018).  After the removal of 
R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V through utilization of the step function, the 
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concentration of residuals remained in the same location, but the number decreased 
(see figures below).  Through a utilization of filter commands in R, there were 1,511 
high residuals identified in the SLR model, and again all of these instances were of the 
attack class (see second figure below and Appendix E for R scripts/outputs).  
 
 





Table 6 – Initial Logistic and Stepwise Logistic Residual Comparison/AIC Values 
 
These results indicate that while there is a subset of the dataset that can be 
classified, that there is a significant portion which cannot.  Unfortunately, this portion of 
the dataset that cannot be classified easily is comprised of the attack data which this 
work seeks to analyze.  Because the residuals indicate a high number of FNs and 
possible non-linearity, the dataset was split into two subsets for further examination.  
These subsets were named “easy” and “hard”, in which the “easy” is termed as such as 
the data initially seems to follow a linear pattern and is comprised of both attacks and 
normal operations for the response variable.  The “hard” subset is termed as such as 
the attack data appears to not follow a linear trend as represented by the residual graph 
above.  Additional SLR models were fitted to each of these data subsets given the 
residual data in an attempt to find if all variables were explanatory for these instances of 
attacks.  The focus for further analysis was the easy subset, as the hard subset was 
comprised of all attacks and thus SLR would remove all variables from the initial model 
and the AIC value would decrease to 0 (see image below for visual representation of 





Figure 5 - Visual Representation of Data Subsets 
 
 Through plotting the residuals utilizing the same methods as the initial SLR 
model, it was observed that while the residual position spatially is similar in the easy 
data subset logistic regression model, the residual number are far less, but again 
consisting of all attacks (see plot and table below) (for R scripts/output, see Appendix F 





Figure 6 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Initial Logistic Regression Model 
 
After obtaining the initial easy logistic regression model from the easy data subset, the 
step function was utilized to perform SLR.  Far lower AIC values were observed initially 
(5998.98), and significant AIC reduction was achieved through the removal of 
R2.PA4.IH (AIC reduced to 4338.98).  However, plotting the residuals of this 
subsequent model and utilizing R Scripts to identify the numbers, it was observed that 
while the AIC value decreased, the number of residuals increased.  Due to the 
implications of a FNs in the ICS context, despite lowering AIC values even one 






Figure 7 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model (R2.PA4.IH removed) 
 
Table 7 - Easy Data Subset Residuals Comparison 
 
Another iteration of stepwise logistic regression was executed given the easy 
subset of data with the removal of suggested variables from the initial SLR model 
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(R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V). As indicated by the tables and figures below, 
there were 132 residuals present in the initial logistic regression model.  After 
application of the step function, the AIC decreased from 10462.4 to 4615.3, and the 
residual number decreased through the removal of R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V, 
R4.PA12.IH, an R3.PA9.VH (see figures/tables below). 
 
 




Figure 9 - Easy Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model 4 (with removal of R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V, 
R4.PA12.IH, and R3.PA9.VH) 
 
Table 8 - Easy Subset Residuals Comparison (with omission of initial logistic regression variables) 
 
 
In summary, SLR yielded minimal results due to complexity of the dataset and 
large degrees of non-linearity indicated by residuals plots.  More evidence of this lies in 
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that of the three iterations of applying a step function to the logistic regression model, 
while the AIC did decrease (at vastly different rates), the removal of variables was 
inconsistent across all iterations.  Through the utilization of SLR, eight unique variables 
were identified to be omitted based on differing configurations of the initial logistic 
regression models.  Additionally, perhaps the most telling indicator of complexity and 
non-linearity which creates difficulty in classification in the dataset is that all residuals 
are attacks.  The residual rate indicates thousands of misclassifications and less than a 
90% accuracy classification, which is not an acceptable metric given the gravity and 
implications of an attack on the grid.  To further analyze the dataset, another statistical 
method was employed. 
The second statistical method utilized was Principal Component Analysis (PCA).  
This method was formulated by Karl Pearson and is often regarded as forming the basis 
for multivariate data analysis (Wold, Esbensen, Geladi, 1987).  PCA is conducted 
through the approximation of a larger matrix via the product of two smaller matrices 
(Wold et al., 1987).  This analysis was designed in Pearson’s words as trying to find 
“lines and planes of closest fit to systems of points in space”, and the major goals of the 
method include simplification of data, data reduction, general modeling, outlier 
detection, variable selection, classification, prediction, and unmixing of data (Wold et al., 
1987).  The majority of these goals are concerned with simplifying data for analysis, 
which is aligned with the primary objective of this works initial statistical analysis (Wold 
et al., 1987).  The hope was that utilizing this method could simplify massive amounts of 
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complex information into an understandable, palatable, and potentially actionable size 
for axiom or rule development.   
PCA was also primarily executed via formulation/execution of scripts in RStudio 
(RStudio Inc., 2011).  The dataset was first standardized and all non-factor variables 
were removed and the prcomp function was utilized to create a model of the data 
utilizing PCA (see Appendix A) (Wiegand, 2018; Coghlan, 2013).  To visualize the data, 
the screeplot function was used, and an analysis revealed that at approximately the 24th 
to 25th transformation the slope starts to level off, which indicates a high degree of 
variance in the data (see image below) (Wiegand, 2018).   
 
 




This was further confirmed through the application of Kaiser’s Criterion which as applied 
to the standardized data would include all translations where the variance was greater 
than 1, which was through the 25th transformation (see figure below). 
  
 
Figure 11 - PCA Standard Deviation and Proportion of Variance 
 
Through an examination of the coefficients in the 25 rotations of the principal 
components, in each of the 116 variables the absolute value of the coefficient was 
greater than .15 in at least one of the principal components, meaning all the variables 
were needed in at least one rotation, but many were needed in multiple rotations (see 
truncated figure below, where x is a variable that represents the absolute value of a 




Figure 12 - PCA Coefficient Output 
 
The results of PCA further suggest that the dataset is non-linear and will likely be 
difficult to analyze via statistical methods.  Also, the outputs suggest there is no simple 
elimination of variables and thus no simplification of the dataset based on the variance 
(Wiegand, 2018).   
With the inability to simplify and reduce the dataset using the statistical methods 
of PCA and SLR, axiom development through said methods is not feasible.  The failure 
of PCA and SLR indicates that the complexity of the dataset exceeds the capacity of 
statistical methods to classify the data and that simple coding of rules/axioms to classify 
an instance as an attack or normal operations is not possible based off this research 
(and the given dataset).    Therefore, more sophisticated methods must be explored to 
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both create detection axioms for remote tripping command injection attacks and classify 
the dataset with a high degree of accuracy.   
 
3.6 Machine Learning Algorithm Approach 
 
As Section 3.3 provided compelling applications of ML algorithms in previous 
research to classify scenarios in ICS, a similar ML methodology to the Borges-Hink et 
al., 2014 article was utilized to determine if results could be replicated/exceeded given  
remote tripping command injection attack and normal operational data.  Aligned with 
this previous related work, the author utilized 10-fold cross validation with a 90/10 
train/test set to train the ML classifiers.  Notable differences from the original research 
include the utilization of only one dataset (binary) as opposed to the original experiment 
which utilized three types of datasets (multiclass, three class, and binary).  Additionally, 
the original research conducted by Borges-Hink et al., 2014 applied the ML algorithms 
to a 1% random sample of the original dataset, whereas this work considers the entire 
modified dataset to increase data and thus analysis of remote tripping command 
injection attacks.   
The primary tool utilized in this research to employ ML and data mining 
techniques was open source software called Waikato Environment for Knowledge 
Analysis (WEKA) (University of Waikato, 1999).  The WEKA project began at the 
University of Waikato in 1992 with the goal of the creation of a unified workbench that 
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would allow researchers access to a wide collection of ML techniques/methods in one 
platform ((Hall, Frank, Holmes, Pfahringer, and Reutemann, 2009; Witten, Date 
Unknown).  While multiple ML algorithms and techniques were available at the time, 
there was a wide array of languages/formats/platforms and no unifying application that 
could be utilized to easily compare and contrast differing algorithms which is necessary 
to determine applicability of a given method/technique (Hall et al., 2009; Witten, Date 
Unknown).  WEKA fixed this issue by allowing users to rapidly compare different ML 
methods on datasets, and the software has been widely used in both academia and the 
private sector since its initial software release (Hall et al., 2009).    
The WEKA project was initially funded by the government of New Zealand and 
was launched with an internal beta stage software release in 1994, and a release to the 
public in 1996 (Hall et al., 2009).  Due to increasing complications in the software such 
as increasing changes to support libraries and complexity of configuration in the original 
C coding, the system was rewritten in Java and rereleased in 1999 (Hall et al., 2009).  
In addition to robust data visualization capabilities, WEKA Explorer (one off the four 
WEKA interfaces) was primarily utilized in this work for data classification and 
rule/model formulation.  WEKA also includes interfaces for large scale performance 
comparisons for differing ML methods on differing datasets (WEKA Experimenter), a 
graphical interface (WEKA KnowledgeFlow), a unified interface (WEKA Workbench), 
and a command line interface (WEKA Simple CU) (Whitten, Date Unknown).  WEKA 
does distinguish between data mining and ML, where data mining can be thought of as 
the acquisition and transformation of raw data into information that can in turn be 
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utilized to answer a given question or hypothesis (likely through the construction of a 
predictive model), and ML can be thought of as the underlaying framework which solves 
said question or hypothesis via the application of algorithms (Whitten, Date Unknown). 
The diversity of academic disciplines that WEKA has been applied to are 
numerous and wide spread, indicating an adaptable and applicable tool to apply ML 
methods to a range of datasets and domains.  In just the last year, WEKA has been 
used as an integral component in research focused on maximizing the utility of 
regression models in ML, online estimation of discrete/continuous/conditional densities, 
ambient sensing of detection for relay attacks in near field communication devices 
utilizing random forests, and even examining the intensity of emotion through the 
analysis of tweets on the popular social media platform Twitter (Branco, Torgo, Ribeiro, 
Frank, Pfahringer, and Rau, 2017; Geilke, Karwath, Frank, and Kramer, 2017; Gurulian, 
Shepherd, Frank, Markantonakis, Akram, and Mayes, 2017; Mohammad and Bravo-
Marquez, 2017; University of Waikato, Publications Page, 2018).   
WEKA has also been utilized in research associated with cybersecurity and IDS.  
Extensive WEKA classifier performance comparison has been applied in analysis of 
attack signatures given the KDD99 dataset (Nguyan and Choi, 2008; Modi and Jain, 
2015).  Anomaly based network intrusion detection has also been explored via the use 
of WEKA Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (J48) classifiers (Nevlud, Bures, Kapicak, and 
Zdralek, 2013).  Discrimination of malicious network communications and minimizing 
reliance on a human operator to interpret an insurmountable amount of data has 
propelled ML methods to prominence in cybersecurity, and there is utility in applying 
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WEKA to research focused on ICS security (Borges-Hink, Beaver, Buckner, Morris, 
Adhikari, and Pan, 2013).  This open source software was utilized due to its noted 
performance in multiple domains, it’s previously established related research, and also 
due to its user friendly/intuitive nature and a manageable learning curve.   
As mentioned above, for this research the WEKA Explorer interface was primarily 
utilized (see figure below).  After loading the dataset and applying preprocessing filters 
to the data to ensure the software read in the proper datatypes (see Appendices H and I 
for detailed steps in WEKA), all variables (which WEKA refers to as attributes) were 
viewed to both confirm previous data analysis in R and further visualize the data given 
WEKA’s capabilities (see figure below in which the red bars in the histogram represent 
attacks and the blue represent normal operations) (Whitten, Date Unknown).  Data 
analysis was consistent with that already executed via R scripts (i.e., numbers of 
attacks/normal operations).  Mean, standard deviation, and the range of values differed 
due to use of the original non-standardized dataset, which was aligned with previous 
associated research.  Classification utilizing ML algorithms was the next step executed 




Figure 13 - WEKA Explorer Interface - Attribute Analysis 
 
WEKA divides classification algorithms into seven distinct groups: Bayesian, 
functions, lazy, meta, miscellaneous, rules, and decision trees (see table below for 
descriptions of each).  While research with the dataset in the past had tested a relatively 
small number of ML algorithms using the default parameters, this work tested all 
algorithms that could be applied to the dataset given classification specifications 
regarding data types. The initial number of classifiers tested was 69, which decreased 
to 15 based off the 95% accuracy metric established by Borges-Hink et al. and further 
detailed in the testing methodology below.   
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Table 9 - WEKA ML Classification Algorithm Groups (Brownlee, 2016;  Tatsis, Tjortjis, and Tzirakis, 2013) 
Classification Group Description 
Bayesian  Uses Bayes theorem in some 
capacity which predict class values 
by probabilities  
Functions Can be written as equation and 
estimates a function 
Lazy Stores training instances and work 
occurs during classification 
Meta Combine multiple algorithms and 
convert them to more powerful 
learners 
Miscellaneous Don’t fit easily into other groups  
Rules Generates rules to classify the data 
Trees Uses decision trees based off root 
attributes and leaf nodes 
 
A three-phase testing/training approach was utilized in which ML classification 
algorithms were compared via extraction of key metrics from the WEKA Explorer 
Classification panel (see figure below, as briefed to thesis advisory committee on 





Figure 14 - ML Approach 
 
After splitting the dataset to a 90% training set and a 10% test set using Ablebits 
software for randomization in the dataset CSV file, the first phase utilized the full training 
dataset to obtain baseline accuracy metrics and create classifier models (see figure 




Figure 15 - Training Set - Baseline ML Algorithm Accuracy Rates 
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IBK (Lazy)
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AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ NNGE) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ LMT) (Meta)
Bagging (Meta)
Bagging (Meta) - J48
CVParameterSelection (Meta)
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - J48
FilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48
LogitBoost (Meta)
MultiClassClassifier (Meta) - JRIP
MultiClassClassifierUpdateable
MultiScheme (Meta) - +Jrip&J48ZeroR
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta)
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48

















 Initial results indicated thirty-seven algorithms met the 95% baseline accuracy 
established in previous research.  The thirty-two classifiers that were omitted based on 
having less than a 95% accuracy rate largely consisted of simplistic rule based learners, 
Bayesian, and functions-based classifiers.  The majority of classifiers that had 95% 





Figure 16 - Baseline ML Algorithm - Accuracy > 95% 
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The second phase of the ML approach utilized 10-fold cross validation to 
evaluate the classifier models based on the training dataset.  Accuracy for all ML 
algorithms decreased during the evaluation utilizing 10-fold cross validation, and of the 
37 algorithms that were initially included in this stage, 22 had classification rates over 
95% (see figures below).  Of note, the majority were again meta classifiers (15), 





Figure 17 - 10x Cross Validation 
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Figure 18 - 10x Cross Validation - >95% Accuracy 
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RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
IBK (Lazy)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - J48
AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)
RandomCommittee (Meta)




After identification of the algorithms that were evaluated at greater than 95%, 
accuracy, the models were applied to an independent dataset.  To better evaluate the 
ML algorithms and identify the most ideal classification scheme, additional metrics 
captured during this final iteration included Root Mean Squared Error, FN rates for the 
attack class, Recall, Precision, F-Measure, and the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) Curve (see table below for brief descriptions).    
Table 10 - Additional ML Metrics (Holmes, 2000, Borges-Hink et al., 2014;  Whitten, Date Unknown) 
Metric Description 
Root Mean Squared Error A standard metric for measuring the 
spread of y values about the predicted 
y value; found by squaring the 
residuals, averaging the squares, and 
taking the square root 
Recall Measures the true positive rate 
Precision Measures the positive predictive value  
F-Measure Harmonic mean of Recall and 
Precisions 
ROC Curve A plot that measures classification 
accuracy of the first class against the 




class; maximization of area under the 
curve indicates highest measure of 
classification accuracy 
Time Taken The time taken to apply the model to 
the test set; only utilized for 
comparison of top 3 models (no 
graphs) 
 
The initial test set comprised of 22 ML algorithms was decreased to a final 16 algorithms, 
which was further decreased to 15 algorithms based off redundant results from the 
RandomSubspace with the default REPTree base classifier and RandomSubspace with 
J48 as the base classifier.  Since the outputs were the same, only the RandomSubspace 
with the default base classifier was retained (see tables below).  Of the final 15 ML 
algorithms with accuracy over 95% as evaluated on the test set, 10 were meta classifiers, 
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Figure 26 - ROC Curve 
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Given these metrics, the top three classifiers based purely on accuracy 
rates consisted of 2 meta classifiers and one tree classifier and had the following 
accuracy rates: RandomCommittee (98.703%), RandomForest (98.627%), and 
AdaboostM1+J48 (98.627%).  The RandomCommittee classifier also 
outperformed RandomForest and AdaboostM1+J48 in regards to the highest 
Recall, Precision, and F-Measure, and the lowest Root Mean Squared Error.  The 
RandomForest classifier outperformed RandomCommittee and AdaboosttM1+J48 
in terms of the ROC Curve (.998 compared to .997 and .996 respectively) and also 
most importantly the FN rate (.005 compared to .007 and .006 respectively).  
Based on the catastrophic consequences of not identifying an attack quickly in an 
ICS environment, the FN rate should be given a great degree of weight when 
identifying the highest performing classifier.  While the Time Taken (TT) rate is 
slightly higher for the RandomForest classifier compared to RandomCommittee 
and AdaboostM1+J48 (.08 seconds compared to .04 seconds and .07 seconds 
respectively), at least given the size of this dataset the increase in classification of 
attacks and minimization of FNs is worth the increase in computational time.  
However, with larger datasets or implementation in an IDS (and much larger 
volumes of data), this TT metric should be considered to a larger extent.  Despite 
the relatively longer TT rate to evaluate the test data, the extremely high accuracy 
and the highest FN rate of the RandomForest algorithm suggests it is the highest 
performer.  Also of note, of the 100 Random Trees generated in the RandomForest 
algorithm, the average size of the tree was 900.3 nodes (see Appendix J for model 
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output from the first Random Tree).  Finally, conducting analysis through the 
attribute importance function within the RandomForest algorithm, it appears that 
109 of the 128 attributes were used to classify an instance in at least one node of 
a Random Tree in the model (see Appendix J).  This further confirms the results 
of the statistical methods, as classification is highly dependent on the utilization of 




CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
This section presents a summary of the results and contributions of the research, 
issues and limitations experienced during the course of the research, and the potential 




Given the current state of cybersecurity and its role in information operations and 
geopolitics, the research of exploitations of the electrical grid are extremely important 
and have the potential to directly affect national security.  This work was focused on one 
possible exploitation that has been documented, but there are likely a myriad of other 
attack vectors as the attack surface is vast.  Still, common TTPs such as spear phishing 
and an escalation of privileges through credential theft are being utilized to gain access 
to these networks, and training/education in proper cybersecurity practices within the 
ICS environment should be at the forefront of organizations in the energy sector.  
However, given that these TTPs are still effective and will likely remain effective, a 
hybrid IDS based off of synchrophasor data attack signatures is a necessity to quickly 
identify malicious activity and mitigate damaging effects.  This research increased the 
knowledge base of remote tripping command injection attacks by demonstrating that 
multiple ML algorithms have a high degree of accuracy and are potentially good 
candidates to form the basis of a detection platform while statistical methods are 
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insufficient.  The contribution to this specific area of cybersecurity/ICS is that this 
research suggests that detection axioms or rules cannot be formulated for remote 
tripping command injection attacks using the statistical methods of SLR and PCA, and 
thus should not be attempted when building signature based models of these attacks.    
Also, given that different attacks could be characterized with optimal performance 
based on differing ML algorithms, this is a contribution to the body of knowledge 
regarding remote tripping command injection attacks.  While the sheer volume of data 
from these measurement units is vast and likely unfathomable to a human operator, the 
application of ML methods can make sense of the data with a high degree of accuracy.  
This research broadened the scope of analysis by the application of numerous ML 
algorithms that had not been applied to analysis of remote tripping command injection 
attacks in previous work to the best knowledge of the author.  Based on the 
preponderance of meta classifiers achieving 95% or greater accuracy on the test set, 
this research also suggests that more sophisticated ML algorithms have greater 
performance classification of remote tripping command injection attacks than simpler 
ML algorithms.  This is related to the finding that the vast majority of variables were 
needed to formulate the RandomForest model which achieved the highest performance.  
Additionally, this research suggests different findings from Borges-Hink et al in which 
JRip+Adaboost was identified as the highest performing classifier for the entire dataset 
and the only classifier of seven that could classify at 95% or greater accuracy.  For the 
subset explored in this work including only remote tripping command injection attacks 
and normal operational data, there are 15 algorithms that can accurately classify over a 
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95% rate.  The work conducted by Borge-Hink et al had classification rates of 
approximately 95% and 79% over the entire binary dataset for JRipper+Adaboost and 
RandomForest respectively, while classification rates for remote tripping command 
injection attacks were 97.864% and 98.627% respectively.  This suggests that specific 
attacks are classified with higher accuracy through an application of differing ML 
algorithms, and that in this case RandomForest is a better classifier for remote tripping 
command injection attacks than JRipper+Adaboost.  To provide a synopsis of the 
results related to the Research Questions introduced in Section 1, each Research 
Question is addressed below. 
 
4.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) Results  
 
The answer to RQ1 is that the statistical methods used in this research could not 
accurately model features of remote tripping command injection attacks on electrical 
grids due to a high degree of non-linearity and complexity in the dataset.  It should be 
noted, that the original intent of this project was to determine simplistic detection axioms 
for remote tripping command injection attacks utilizing statistical methods.  As described 
above, due to the composition of the dataset, these axioms were not possible to create 
given the statistical methods utilized.  This is not to say that all statistical methods are 
incapable of producing axioms or rules that properly characterize data and thus provide 
an output as to whether at attack is occurring or not, but that the application of the 




4.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) Results 
 
Through an execution of numerous ML algorithms in WEKA, it is clear that given 
the modified dataset that classification over 95% is possible for many algorithms (refer 
to Section 3.5).  After splitting the dataset into training and test sets, accuracy metrics 
were determined via the use of the entire training set to build classifier models and 
evaluation through 10-fold Cross Validation.  After execution of 10-fold Cross Validation 
was conducted an additional iteration of testing was conducted on an independent test 
set, it was determined that 15 algorithms achieved over 95% classification rates.  
Additionally, other metrics such as the FN rate suggest that the RandomForest 




4.1.3 Research Question 3 (RQ3) Results 
 
This is dependent on the individual IDS of an ICS environment, but this work has 
laid the groundwork for developing a signature based model for remote tripping 
command injection attacks based on detection axioms.  Signature based models of 
87 
 
attacks have been utilized with high degrees of success and synchrophasor 
measurements based IDS have demonstrated a capacity to detect attacks that 
traditional IDS in ICS have not.  The ML models formulated in this work are detection 
axioms or rules that characterize or describe remote tripping command injection attacks 
to a great degree of accuracy and could be utilized in future work with further validation.  
 
4.1.4 Research Question 4 (RQ4) Results 
 
GINA takes information from disparate domains (i.e., IT logs and OT sensor 
data), collates the data, and utilizes a unique form of modeling that has the ability to 
classify the data.  While it is first necessary to construct a conceptual model based on 
detection axioms for implementation into GINA, there is a possibility given accuracy 
levels of the highest performing ML algorithms that the models/detection axioms 
established in this work could be incorporated in future work (see Section 4.3 for 




Given the omission of natural events and other attacks in the modified dataset 
used in this work, it is possible that the simplification of the dataset led to an increase in 
classification rates via the reduction in noise created by additional scenarios.  The 
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modifications to the original dataset while extensive are still essentially subsetting the 
data into a more manageable and simpler dataset.  While this was intentional to analyze 
only remote tripping command injection attacks in comparison to normal operations, the 
conditions are not representative of all activity/scenarios that could be experienced in an 
ICS environment.  Also, in Borges-Hink et al. the datasets were randomly sampled at 
1% of the original dataset to reduce the size and evaluate the effectiveness of small 
sample sizes.  This must be noted in the final results, as the dataset used in this work 
was approximately 3x greater than this dataset.  Additionally, infinite values were 
modified in the dataset to facilitate analysis in R as detailed in Section 3.4 and were 
kept for the purpose of analysis comparison and consistency across ML and statistical 
methods. 
Another associated issue in both the original dataset and the modified dataset 
used in this research is class imbalance.  As previously mentioned in Section 3.4, there 
were 8,737 attacks and 4,405 normal operational instances.  This does not likely mirror 
the daily operational data distribution observed in an ICS environment due to the large 
proportion of attacks compared to normal operations.  Therefore, if a more realistic 
dataset was evaluated with the top performing ML algorithms identified in this work, the 
results could differ significantly.  In future work, methods of reducing class imbalance 
could be employed on this dataset and the resulting ML algorithm accuracy metrics 
could be comparatively evaluated (Caulkins, 2018; Lathrop, 2018; Wiegand, 2018). 
A peripheral technical issue associated with this work is that synchrophasor units 
can be targeted by attackers, as IECC C37.1118 (the protocol for synchrophasor data 
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communication) does not support any authentication and thus readings of sensors could 
be manipulated and render a system obsolete through exploitation of Man-in-the-Middle 
types of attacks (Borges-Hink et al., 2014; Yang, McLaughlin, Sezer, Littler, Pranggono, 
Brogan, and Wong, 2013).  This was outside the scope of this research, which sought to 
utilize synchrophasor data to detect remote tripping command injection attacks but did 
not address exploitation of the PMUs themselves.  Another technical issue is that this 
dataset reflects a non-pilot directional over current relay protection scheme in multiple 
source circuits (Pan et al., March 2015). While this type of protection was utilized in the 
original study due that makes up the majority of the electric transmission system, other 
circuits exist such as loop and radial circuits are also present in the electrical grid and 
the results/models obtained in this work could be nonapplicable to systems with these 
components (Pan et al., March 2015).   
There are also potential WEKA comparison issues with the previous work 
conducted by Borges-Hink et al. After consulting with the lead author about parameters 
and reading datatypes in to WEKA, due to a loss of the original results an approximation 
of accuracy, precision, recall, and F-Measure was used based off interpretation of 
graphs in the article.  Additionally, the author stated that he did not believe he used IT 
component logs for his paper, which would indicate IT variables have little to no effect 
on classification accuracy in the original work.  While this would be a unique contribution 
to the body of research for this work, the original work does directly refute this by 
including the IT logs as part of Results Section C (Borges-Hink et al., 2014).  Finally, to 
compare training to test sets an InputMappedClassifier application was used in WEKA 
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so that differing value ranges for R1-R4.PA.Z could be utilized during the final phase of 
testing.  The original author stated that he could not recall how he had compared 
training to test sets in WEKA and could not confirm or deny he used the 
InputMappedClassifier (Borges-Hink, 2018).  Also, regarding the WEKA evaluation 
methodology, the ML algorithms are stochastic methods that were only run once during 
analysis in this work (Wiegand, 2018).  It is likely that reevaluating the ML algorithms 
with differing Random Seed values would result in differing metrics and could potentially 
give a more complete picture of a model’s ability to classify remote tripping command 
injection attacks (Wiegand, 2018). 
Another associated issues about the PMU data in IDS is consternation regarding 
data storage. If this small testbed architecture is generating over 13,000 datapoints in a 
short amount of time, there are undoubtedly related issues regarding storage of the 
data, policies related as to how long to keep the data, and what criteria would need to 
be met to keep data long term at the present time (Redwood, 2018).  This is likely a 
reason for energy companies to rely on more traditional IDS without synchrophasor 
measurements incorporated, but with the increase in computational power and storage 
capacity there is a possibility that IDS incorporating synchrophasor data will become 
more widespread (Redwood, 2018). 
 




While this research suggests that ML models/axioms were successful in 
identifying remote tripping command injection attacks, further research and additional 
testing should be done to confirm these results.  Testing actual remote tripping 
command injections outside of a laboratory or testbed environment is likely not possible 
due to the ramifications of the attack, but the ML algorithms/detection axioms could be 
validated on multiple independent datasets.  A future expansion of this work could be to 
incorporate the other attack and natural scenarios in a binary dataset and observe if the 
accuracy metrics were replicated.  Further parameter calibration of the highest 
performing ML algorithms identified could be another potential direction for expanding 
this work.  An analysis given these axioms/ML models and a different testbed 
architecture could be utilized to find if accuracy metrics are confirmed in a completely 
independent dataset (i.e., one that is not a subset of existing data).  If the detection 
axioms/attack models are confirmed in separate independent testing, this increases the 
viability of integrating this research into a hybrid IDS that incorporates synchrophasor 
data.   
There is also a potential for Vector Relational Data Modeling (VRDM) to be 
utilized in future work as it has been shown to be effective in real time multivariate 
analysis (Dougherty, 2017).  VRDM is the underlying framework or the programming 
language engine powering a software solution called the Global Information Network 
Architecture (GINA), which has been utilized for such applications as identifying and 
comparing Naval Energy Weapons systems, enabling system interoperability in smart 
mobile system services of network decision support systems, geospatial mapping of IP 
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addresses, and automated threat analysis via IDS (Dougherty, 2017; Dolk, Busalacchi, 
Anderson and Tinsley, 2012, ,and Cohort 19, Team Bravo, 2013).  GINA recognizes 
relationships between data objects specified by the user and does not require coding, 
which offers benefits in time conservation and also decreases errors associated with 
physically coding the model and encourages a focus on the design of overarching 
attributes and functionality of the model, as opposed to hard coded mechanics (Cohort 
19, Team Bravo, 2013; Dolk et al., 2012). Additionally, a model can be easily 
recalibrated or modified and does not force a complete recoding effort (Cohort 19, Team 
Bravo, 2013;  Dolk et al., 2012).   
As demonstrated in the previous sections, ICS environments have many complex 
relationships that increases the difficulty of constructing an accurate model.  GINA 
provides the user with an interface to model these complex interactions across domains 
that is both intuitive and not resource intensive, which is especially appropriate given 
the nature and interconnected relationships of vast amounts of IT and OT components 
in ICS.  Conceptual relationship models can be easily implemented given a user’s 
knowledge of a domain and ability to discern interactions between components.  While it 
was not possible to integrate the ML models/detection axioms established in this 
research due to time constraints stemming from complications during dataset analysis, 
the ML models/detection axioms established in this work could potentially be 
implemented in GINA in the future for further analysis of remote tripping command 









The scripts below in R detail the process of executing Principal Component 
Analysis given the standardized dataset (Coghlan, 2013 and Wiegand, 2018).  Outputs 
include the screeplot, standard deviation/proportion of variance, and coefficient analysis 

























The loading, initial summary, and structure of the data was found through the 
execution of the R Scripts below (Boone, 2010, Stack Overflow Thread, 2014, Stack 
Overflow Thread, 2015, Mollie, 2013, and Wiegand, 2018).   Outputs for the data 























To both modify the original dataset with only applicable data and facilitate initial 
data analysis in an easily readable format, the following data conversion was conducted 
via R.  This process was iterative, in that each of the fifteen datasets in ARFF format 
was read in via the file choose function, and then exported to a CSV file and named 
sequentially (i.e., test1, test2…test15).  Upon completion each iteration, the author 
utilized the summary function to ensure that the data in the newly exported files 
matched the original datasets, and also checked the CSVs manually via opening the 
files and observing/comparing the data.  A screenshot of the R script is displayed below 










The first R script below was utilized to produce the plots for R1 given the non-
standardized dataset.  R2, R3, R4 were produced using the same commands (given the 
different variables with respect to marker).  The second R script below was utilized to 
produce bar charts for R1.  Bar charts were selected due to both the marker and 
relay/SNORT logs were binary data. Relay and snort logs 2-4 were produced utilizing 
the same commands (control panel graphs omitted due to all data being a 0 indicating 
normal operations) (Kabacoff, 2017).  The plots of each of the 129 variables are listed 





























APPENDIX E. INITIAL STANDARDIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND STEPWISE 





The R scripts and subsequent outputs below are of the initial logistic regression 
model and subsequent stepwise logistic regression model given the standardized 
dataset (Wiegand, 2018).  All logs were removed due to constraints of R to create 
generalized linear models with numeric data types.   The initial output from logistic 
regression also displays that R4.S should likely be removed due to its importance (all 
values were 0 for this variable in the non-standardized dataset, and -.04 in the 
standardized dataset).  After the application of the step function, the AIC value was 
reduced from 254339.8 to 151248.9 with the removal of R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and 
R3.PM7.V.  For brevity, only the output showing the beginning AIC value and the final 
results are included below.  Residual plots and scripts to identify 
numbers/characteristics of residuals of both the initial data and subsequent stepwise 











































APPENDIX F. EASY SUBSET STANDADIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND 





The R scripts/outputs below show the subsetting of the standardized dataset and 
logistic regression and SLR models given the easy subset (indicated by over a value of 
2.0 of the square root of the standard deviance) (Wiegand, 2018).  As the results from 
summary of the easy logistic regression model were replicated from the initial logistic 
regression in that all variables are significant, it is not included below.  After the 
application of the step function, the AIC value was reduced from 5999.98 to 4333.98 





































The same process was utilized for these logistic and stepwise logistic regression 
models given the easy subset, but with the omission of variables from the initial 
stepwise logistic regression model (R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V).  After the 
application of the step function, the AIC value was reduced from 10462.4 to 4615.3 with 

































After opening WEKA software, the Explorer option was chosen (see first image 
below).  Utilizing the “Open file” button in the upper right hand corner in the Preprocess 
tab in the GUI, the training dataset was selected and opened (TRAINING SPLIT – 
FINAL – NO INFS – BINARY (UPDATED AS OF 18MAY18).csv,arff; see second image 
below).  After loading the dataset, variables (referred to as attributes in WEKA) are 
displayed with the minimum values, maximum values, mean, and standard deviation in 
the GUI (see third image below; the first variable R1-PA1-VH is displayed).  Upon 
observing the data, it was noticed that multiple variables were incorrectly classified by 
data type.  Specifically, that nominal/binary values were being read in to WEKA as 
numeric values (variables 117-129, all log files and the marker).  To address this, the 
variables whose data types were incorrect were selected and the filter 
NumerictoNominal was applied (see fourth image below).  The attributes/indices were 
then modified to incorporate the applicable variables by right clicking in the space and 
selecting “show properties” and then “OK” (see fifth image below).  After closing the 
properties box, the “Apply” button was selected in order to change the data types of the 
selected variables from numeric to nominal.  The output of a selected variable was 
automatically colored after this step (blue for normal operations, red for an attack) and 
the data type in the selected attribute panel reflects a nominal data type (see sixth 
image below).  This concludes the steps taken to preprocess the data in WEKA prior to 




















After preprocessing the dataset in WEKA, the “Classify” tab was selected, and 
under the “Classifier” panel various classifier were selected to compare performance 
(the image below only shows AdaboostM1+JRipper).  AdaboostM1+JRipper was first 
selected using the “Choose” button under the “meta” classifiers folder, and the 
properties were modified to utilize this classifier in conjunction with JRipper.  This was 
done via right clicking in the space next to AdaboostM1 next to the “Choose” button and 
selecting “Show Properties” (see second image below).  The classifier JRipper was then 
selected by clicking the “Choose” button next to the classifier field, and then selecting 
JRipper from the “rules” classifier folder and then clicking “OK” (see third image below).  














APPENDIX J. RANDOMFOREST ML ALGORITHM OUTPUTS 
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The WEKA output below includes the first Random Tree from the RandomForest 
algorithm, attribute importance, and summary statistics.  Due to the large size of the 
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